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In late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century Britain, a decisive shift occurred in assumptions about the 
nature and viability of commercial society and how it needed to be organised in order to ensure social 
order and national prosperity. This transformation was part of a wider intellectual and cultural shift that 
attempted to make sense of changes in political and economic institutions or to shape these changes. 
The intellectual endeavour to explain or control new processes of wealth creation and urbanisation 
produced key concepts for thinking about the social, economic, spatial, and political organisation of 
industrial societies, and gave rise to both social statistics and political economy. These emerging bodies 
of knowledge challenged the older householding framework for thinking about labour and wealth creation. 
In the 1820s, the two approaches came into conflict in debates about the desirability of establishing 





In the debate among social reformers, clergymen, parliamentarians, and political economists 
about Mechanics’ Institutes in Britain in the 1820s, the emerging discipline of political economy 
challenged an older discourse concerned with the preservation of a hierarchical socio-economic 
order. The opponents of the Institutes argued that national prosperity depended upon working 
men’s cultivation of sobriety and deference which required religious virtue rather than a 
scientific education. Drawing upon the principles of political economy, the supporters of the 
Mechanicsʹ Institutes argued that prosperity depended upon the law of supply and demand in 
relation to labour. They assumed that removing distortions in the labour market such as 
collective action by workers and poor relief would create the conditions under which it was safe 
for workers to pursue their own self-betterment. The advocates of Mechanics’ Institutes argued 
that a rising standard of living for workers was compatible with national prosperity and that a 
scientifically-educated workforce would contribute to both. 
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A full history of adult education for working people that stretched back to the 
eighteenth century is beyond the purview of this study. The debates surrounding the 
establishment of Mechanics’ Institutes for working men, however, provide an opportunity to 
examine the intellectual shift in thinking about wealth creation which took place in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This study begins by briefly outlining two 
approaches to the comparison of conceptual frameworks for analysing social systems in 
different historical periods. It then sketches the eighteenth-century householding conception of 
society and the rival discourse of political economy. This is followed by a discussion of the 
heated and public exchange of views about the establishment of Mechanicsʹ Institutes which 
followed the publication of Henry Brougham’s Practical Observations on the Education of the People 
addressed to the Working Class and their Employers in 1825. 
The debate about Mechanics’ Institutes brings into focus the fundamental 
transformation in ideas about wealth creation and social relationships represented by the 
emergence of political economy. For the first time since the evolution of private property, the 
promotion of the social aspirations and material desires of ordinary men and women became a 
central concern of government in Britain. The new understanding of human behaviour allowed 
the advocates of Mechanics’ Institutes to move beyond the belief that driving down wages was 
necessary in order to secure social stability. 
 
Historical Comparison of Social Systems 
 
The early nineteenth-century debate in Britain about Mechanics’ Institutes is of particular 
interest because it brings into focus two different visions of the “moral purpose of the state.” 
Reus-Smit (1999) argues that in different historical periods, European states have been 
characterised by differing complexes of values which define a desirable social order as well as 
the nature and limits of the authority of the state. The core of these values is a prevailing belief 
about the moral purpose of the state which embodies the reasons held by historical agents for 
organising political life within a territorially-bounded unit. Such purposes are moral because 
they always entail a conception of the individual or social good served by the state (13-15). They 
provide the foundation for a set of fundamental institutions that are peculiar to different 
historical and cultural contexts. Changes in values generate new social identities and new 
institutions (30-33). 
Reus-Smit’s (1999) understanding that the identity and moral purpose of participating 
states are characterized by particular institutions and practices is similar to the notion of 
political rationality used by Anglo-Foucauldian scholars to delineate forms of wealth creation 
and different modes of government in different historical periods. Using this Foucauldian 
approach, Rose and Miller (1992) focus on four political rationalities that correspond broadly 
with specific historical periods: raison dʹétat and its accompanying science of police in the 
eighteenth century, liberalism in the nineteenth century, and welfarism and neoliberalism in the 
twentieth century. Here “police science” refers to the construction of a detailed web of 
regulations and decrees through which centralized administrations sought to impose order 
upon the population within their national territories. It was founded on the assumption that 
social order required detailed moral supervision of the wage-earning population. In this study, 
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the term “householding” is used to refer to the form of the state in eighteenth-century England, 
in preference to either “absolutism” or “police,” terms favoured by Anglo-Foucauldians. 
 
Householding Model of the State 
 
Arguments against the establishment of Mechanics’ Institutes in the 1820s draw upon 
assumptions about the moral purpose of the state that are characteristic of the householding 
conception of government. This view predominated in Britain and continental Europe for much 
of the eighteenth century but was challenged and eventually displaced by political economy. A 
decisive event in the displacement of the householding conception of governing was Adam 
Smith’s An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, published in 1776. The 
view, however, that detailed supervision of the labouring population was necessary and that 
wage-earners should live at or close to subsistence continued to inform public debate well into 
the nineteenth century. 
In the householding model, the moral purpose of the state was defined as the 
preservation of a natural hierarchical social order, symbolised by the patriarchal household. The 
ideal state reflected the division of labour and authority structure of a well-ordered family in 
which individuals were fully subordinated to both the authority of the head and the needs of 
the larger unit. The most extensive elaboration of the householding conception of government 
in the English language is found in James Steuart’s An Inquiry into the Principles of Political 
Oeconomy, published in 1767. According to Steuart, in the administration of the state, the 
sovereign, statesman, or legislature occupies a role analogous to the head of a family. At the 
level of the state, “the whole economy must be directed by the head” in order to provide for the 
“nourishment, the other wants and employment of every individual” (15). 
The householding model of government was formulated in the absence of the notion of 
“the economy” in its contemporary sense of a self-regulating system. Helliwell and Hindess 
(1999, 10) argue that until the late eighteenth century, the inability to see the economy as an 
independent reality subject to its own laws meant that wealth creation was regarded as an 
artefact of government action. Tribe (1978) makes a similar case. He contends that eighteenth-
century writers such as Steuart (1767) discuss trade, agriculture, and manufacturing as distinct 
entities unable to combine spontaneously to form a self-regulating system. Prosperity and social 
stability are conceived as products of the sovereignʹs ability to create stable and productive 
interrelationships between these disaggregated domains. According to Tribe, the creation of 
wealth could not be conceived without the “presence of the monarchʹs guiding [hand] to place 
the activity within some ordered framework” (82). This constant anxiety about the need to 
regulate economic activity, common in eighteenth-century thought, does not preclude a 
growing awareness of the role of supply and demand in setting prices but it suggests that 
commentators had little confidence in the notion that economic activity, if left to itself, was self-
regulating. 
Since economic activity was not regarded as self-regulating, eighteenth-century 
commentators working within the householding framework assumed that governments needed 
to intervene continually to prevent crises of unemployment and uncompetitive exports. Steuart 
(1767, 190-191) explained the crises or “vibrations” as a consequence of the failure of supply and 
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demand to fall into equilibrium. If the statesman allows “natural consequences to follow upon 
one another,” the result is “violent competition” between workmen and those who buy from 
them which results in either mass unemployment or a permanent rise in profits, wages, and 
prices, making English manufactures uncompetitive in foreign markets. The crisis-prone nature 
of economic life leads Steuart to compare superintending the process of wealth creation to 
taking care of watches “which are continually going wrong” (217). Josiah Tucker (1755), lauded 
by Hayek (1947, 7; 1967, 100-101; 1985, 135, 259) as an early advocate of economic freedom, also 
stressed the need for vigilant monitoring of the processes of wealth creation and the imposition 
of taxes and duties to correct possible threats to national prosperity. 
Calls for government interventions of various kinds were frequently expressed in terms 
of the statesman or legislatureʹs concern for the labouring population. References to the 
“tenderness” (Hanway 1767, ii) of the ruler for his subjects, however, were not, in the eighteenth 
century, incompatible with the acceptance that inequality was a necessary element of national 
prosperity. John Gwynn (1767, 2) dedicated his tract, which argued that working men must live 
close to subsistence to a “prince whose supreme happiness consists in promoting the good and 
welfare of his subjects.” Material and social differences were regarded as natural and inevitable 
and could not be removed without a nation losing ground in competition for international 
markets and risking social chaos at home. Gwynn (1767, 10) pointed out that “no man in his 
senses would argue for an equality among mankind[;] to destroy distinctions would be to 
destroy all order and decorum.” 
The assumption that inequality was necessary for national prosperity is evident in 
eighteenth-century thinking about wages and consumption. Until the latter part of the century, 
a concern with the price of exports, of which wages were believed to be the major determinant, 
served to reinforce the idea that wages should be kept as low as was compatible with the 
reproduction of the labour force. Likewise, the assumption that the prosperity of England 
depended upon the working population living close to subsistence levels made it impossible for 
most thinkers to believe that a rising standard of living for wage-earners was desirable. The 
consumption by labourers of non-necessary items could only be thought of as a sign that wages 
were too high, with a consequent negative effect upon the price of goods for export. The level of 
individual wealth and well-being of labourers was not assumed to be identical with national 
wealth. Wealth creation was pursued by constraining the standard of living of the working 
population. 
 
Political Economy: Self-regulating Domains and Social Laws 
 
The proponents of the Mechanicsʹ Institutes worked within a conceptual framework which 
emerged from the “fundamental and deep seated upheaval” (Wittrock, Heilbron and 
Magnusson 1998, 1) which took place in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in 
Britain. In this transformation, the values and practices that constituted the householding 
model of the state were challenged and eventually displaced by a new way of thinking about 
the moral purpose of the state which was embodied in the emerging discipline of political 
economy. Political economists assumed that human behaviour was governed by social laws 
similar to the laws that govern the physical world. Furthermore, they argued that these laws 
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were susceptible to discovery and articulation by systematic intellectual investigation. The 
proponents of Mechanics’ Institutes made the further argument that if the behaviour of workers 
conformed to the laws governing the economy, forcing down wages and controls upon 
consumption was rendered unnecessary for social order and the creation of wealth. 
Helliwell and Hindess (1999) note that at the end of the eighteenth century, the idea 
emerged that the behaviour of individuals could be governed by their interactions with others 
without the need for detailed regulation by external authorities. They give as an example Adam 
Smith’s argument in The Wealth of Nations (1976) that wealth will be optimised where economic 
agents are free to interact on the basis of prices that they themselves determine through the 
market. According to Helliwell and Hindess (1999, 14), Smith uses the relationship between 
prices and the unconstrained economic choices of individuals to suggest that the process of 
wealth creation forms a self-regulating system that is independent of the sphere of government. 
Reus-Smit (1999, 127-128) sees the changing attitude towards individual choice found in 
Smith as constitutive of a shift in the moral purpose of the state. He argues that in the course of 
the eighteenth century, the values that were linked to creating a hierarchical social order 
modelled on the patriarchal household were displaced by a moral purpose grounded in human 
striving for betterment. In contrast to the holistic or collective orientation of earlier forms of 
rule, the moral purpose of the state in the nineteenth century was the construction of a social, 
economic, and political order that augmented individual capabilities and interests. In the 
political sphere, the image of a divinely-ordained social organism modelled on the patriarchal 
household was replaced by the idea of a community of free and at least notionally-equal 
individuals. 
The assumption that human strivings produce order rather than chaos was linked to the 
idea that individuals are endowed with a capacity for autonomy and self-regulation. This 
capacity was thought to be less well developed in some settings or among some groups 
(Hindess 1996, 73). In the case of wage-earners, the capacity for self-regulation was judged by 
the individual’s ability to maintain himself and his family without recourse to welfare relief 
provided under the Poor Laws. The theme of wage-earner independence runs through 
discussions of public policy from the late eighteenth century and it challenged the 
householding model in which responsibility falls to the government to provide employment 
and food for those in need. This challenge is fundamental to the work of Malthus (1989) who 
argued that accepting that the process of population growth is subject to its own natural laws 
makes the idea that government can provide employment and sustenance for all the nationʹs 
inhabitantʹs “arrogant,” “absurd,” and an “absolute impossibility.” He warned his readers that 
“Canute, when he commanded the waves not to wet his princely foot, did not in reality assume 
a greater power over the laws of nature” (I: 36). 
To ensure that the processes of population growth and wealth creation were able to 
achieve stable self-regulation, Malthus advocated the abolition of the Poor Laws. Interference 
with the operation of the laws of supply and demand for labour, either through subsidizing 
wages or the provision of public relief, was condemned as a cause of poverty, distress, and 
social disorder among the wage-earning population. Malthus argued that abolition would 
ensure that any increase in population would take place only with an increase in the food 
supply needed to support it. Wages set by market mechanisms would remove the tendency of 
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supply to outstrip the demand for labour which the Poor Laws encouraged. Malthus assumed 
that moving the poor off public welfare was the key to both individual well-being and national 
economic prosperity. 
 
The Mechanics’ Institutes Debate 
 
The two approaches to wealth creation and social order outlined above can be discerned in the 
heated debate following the publication in 1825 of Henry Brougham’s Practical Observations 
upon the Education of the People, Addressed to the Working Classes and their Employees. The purpose 
of the pamphlet was to encourage employers and the wealthy to support the Mechanics’ 
Institute movement. The first fully-fledged Institute was established in Edinburgh in 1821, 
building on the early work of George Birbeck, who from 1799 to 1804, provided a course of 
lectures in practical science for working men and upon the work of his successor Andrew Ure 
(Kelly 1970). It was followed in 1823 by an Institute in Glasgow and in 1825 by the London 
Mechanics’ Institute of which Brougham was a keen supporter. By 1826, over 100 Institutes 
existed. Although some Institutes were established by working men themselves, their survival 
depended upon middle-class and aristocratic support (Kelly 1970). Practical Observations was 
intended to set out the principles underlying the movement and to engage the support of the 
middle and upper classes. 
At the time of the publication of his pamphlet in 1825, Henry Brougham was a 
prominent Whig statesman and educational reformer, with a long history of championing 
educational reform. In 1830, he was Lord Chancellor in Grey’s government and later, a 
contributor to the passing of the Reform Act of 1832. From his entry into Parliament in 1810, 
Brougham was an untiring advocate for working-class education through articles, public 
speeches, and parliamentary debate. In 1816, he chaired the Select Committee on the Education 
of the Lower Orders and subsequently produced proposals for the reform of charity 
establishments using the more efficient monitorial system as his model. His Education Bill of 
1820 proposed a national system based on the provision of buildings by owners of 
manufacturing concerns with running costs to be met from rates, endowments, and fees. The 
plan necessitated a degree of compromise by both the Established Church and the Dissenters, 
and this deprived the bill of the universal support needed for success. The failure of his 
Education Bill did not weaken Brougham’s conviction that education for the working class was a 
key factor in promoting national prosperity, and providing working men with a share of that 
prosperity. He continued his efforts to expand elementary education, played a leading role in 
the establishment of Mechanics’ Institutes and the Society for the Diffusion of Useful 
Knowledge, and was a founder of London University. 
According to Kelly (1957), Brougham’s Practical Observations, which set out proposals for 
the establishment of Mechanics’ Institutes, had a “tremendous influence,” and it went through 
twenty editions in its first year. New (1961, 336-337) recounts that the pamphlet quickly became 
“the Bible” of the Mechanics’ Institute movement and found its way into many of Britain’s 
remotest villages. Its price made it accessible to almost anyone who could read. Both Tylecote 
(1957, 20) and Stewart (1985) remark upon its undoubted influence. 
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The enthusiasm with which founders and supporters of Mechanics’ Institutes quoted 
from the pamphlet was matched by the virulence with which it was condemned by opponents 
of a scientific education for working men. Kelly (1970) states that the supporters of the 
Mechanics’ Institutes tended to be Whigs and Dissenters, particularly Unitarians. Tories and 
Anglicans “either stood aside or were openly hostile” (123). The radical and Whig newspapers, 
particularly the Edinburgh Review, were strong supporters. Right-wing papers such as Bell’s 
Weekly Messenger were opposed and provided a voice for those who distrusted Brougham and 
saw the Institutes as a threat to property (Kelly 1957). Tylecote (1957) also notes that among 
public figures, support for the London Institute came almost exclusively from Whigs and that 
many Institutes were faced with “persistent opposition” from the Tory party with some 
exceptions such as the Liverpool Institute. She agrees with Kelly (1957) that the Dissenters were 
prominent supporters of the Mechanics’ Institutes, while opposition was often lead by 
Established Church clergy. 
The appearance of the pamphlet prompted several negative replies which themselves 
became the subject of critique in the pages of the Edinburgh Review and Blackwood’s Magazine 
throughout 1825 and 1826. The present study uses the arguments presented by Brougham, 
Henry Martin, James Walker, and the counter-arguments employed by Reverend E. Grinfield, 
Reverend G. Wright, and A Country Gentleman (the nome de plume of one of Brougham’s most 
trenchant critics) as an instance of the wider cultural and intellectual shift that occurred in the 
early nineteenth century. The following section of the study begins by outlining the arguments 
for Mechanics’ Institutes set out by Brougham in Practical Observations and the support given to 
them in Martin and Walker’s pamphlets. 
 
Arguments for the Establishment of Mechanics' Institutes 
 
In the second decade of the nineteenth century, the desire to assist working men to improve 
those capacities which were most intimately connected to their own self betterment and more 
broadly to the nationʹs prosperity led to proposals for a scientific education through the 
establishment of Mechanicsʹ Institutes. The purpose of the Institutes was to build upon the 
foundation of elementary education by enhancing individual productivity and providing an 
avenue for self-improvement. The proponents of the Mechanicsʹ Institutes presented a more 
optimistic view of commercial society than that of Malthus in his earlier writings.1 Their 
advocacy of education as a means of self-improvement for working men was more in keeping 
with Malthus’ later view that access to a higher standard of living could provide the motivation 
for men to limit the size of their families in order not to jeopardize their new-found material 
comfort (1989, II: 85). 
The aim of the Institutes was to enable and encourage working men to better themselves 
personally and materially through education. The association between education and 
improvement was expressed by Brougham, who assumed that the “pleasure and improvement 
to be derived from reading. . . is the surest way to raise our characters and better our condition” 
(1825, 1). Although Brougham saw the Institutes as a way to “improve morals, expand the 
understanding and refine the taste” (12) he was also keenly aware of the material advantages 
for individual workers and for national economic security. He advised that “instruction in the 
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principles upon which the arts depend, will repay in actual profit those who live by the arts, far 
more than the cost of learning. An artisan, a dyer, an engine maker, will gain the more in 
money or moneyʹs worth for being an expert chemist or mechanician; and a farm servant or 
bailiff, for knowing the economy and diseases of cattle” (12). The possibility of advancement 
extended to those from poor backgrounds who applied themselves to scientific studies. 
Brougham recounted the story of how “a young man in humble life had been selected from 
among many applicants, to fill a considerable place in the manufactory on account of his 
proficiency in science” (12). 
Other supporters of the Institutes stated the aims in more philosophical terms. They 
connected the establishment of the Institutes to the natural progress of knowledge which, they 
believed was spreading to the labouring population (Hodgskin 1824; Walker 1825; Martin 
1826). In his pamphlet supporting Broughamʹs proposals to provide a scientific education for 
the working classes, Henry Martin (1826, 11) observed that “an almost insatiable thirst for 
information has spread over the nations, the floodgates must be opened - this is inevitable and 
the only subject that remains for our consideration is the direction of the stream.” James Walker 
(1825, 3), the pioneer of a successful book exchange scheme for workers and apprentices in 
Liverpool, supported the establishment of more Institutes on the grounds that “the human 
mind indeed is a tablet which the more it is polished the more it becomes beautiful in 
brightness and adamantine in strength.” Despite the poetic tone of his introduction, Walker 
went on to argue that Mechanicsʹ Institutes were synonymous with increased national 
prosperity because wealth depends upon the utilization and improvement of the talents of 
individual workmen. 
The necessity to preserve the economic independence of wage-earners upon which the 
principles of population and wealth creation rested were prominent in public discussion of 
Mechanicsʹ Institutes. The various newspaper articles, pamphlets, and speeches proposing the 
establishment of the Institutes took up the problem of how the middle and upper classes could 
assist the wage-earners to build upon the education received in day schools without in any way 
compromising their economic and social autonomy. Promoters of the Institutes argued that 
government interference in the provision of elementary schools for children was legitimate on 
the grounds that children were a dependent population. Interference in the lives of workers, 
either by governments or well-meaning private citizens, however, was seen as detrimental 
because it weakened the independence which motivated them to maintain themselves and their 
families through participation in the labour market without recourse to assistance provided 
under the Poor Laws (Brougham 1825, 9). 
Brougham proposed two measures to ensure that the Mechanicsʹ Institutes did not 
compromise the independence of the community of working men for whom they were to cater. 
The first was that working men must pay for their education. Brougham (1825, 1) maintained 
that “the people themselves must be the great agents of their own instruction” which meant 
that “in forming these institutions, it is a fundamental principle that the expenses be defrayed 
by the mechanics themselves” (15). The second was that working men should undertake the 
running of the Institutes. To achieve this goal, Brougham advised that the role of middle and 
upper-class supporters should be restricted to helping with the initial establishment. Wealthy 
supporters were encouraged to contribute organisational expertise and cash advances but 
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warned that any further interference would be counter-productive if not disastrous. Brougham 
concluded his discussion of non-interference by pointing out that the value of the knowledge 
gained by workers from their attendance at the Institutes would be lost if acquired at the cost of 
independence. He advised middle and upper-class supporters that if they “keep the 
management entirely in their own hands they enforce the appeal to gratitude by something 
very like control; and they hurt the character of those whom they would serve” (17). 
Proponents of the Institutes rejected both the argument that the only function of 
education should be to teach moral restraint and the fear that encouraging working men to 
pursue a higher standard of living would lead to social upheaval. In response to the first, Henry 
Martin (1825, 16) conceded that “no education can be of lasting benefit either for the individual 
or the community which has not religion as its basis,” but went on to insist that he would not 
“thrust religion into every institution established for the purpose of conveying instruction.” He 
acknowledged that religious knowledge was necessary for producing independence and moral 
restraint but advised that once these attributes were established, working men could safely 
enter, “without danger”, into scientific studies “where the introduction of religious systems 
would be irrelevant.” For the proponents of the Institutes, education ceased to be perceived 
solely in the negative as a means of producing abstinence and frugality and began to emerge as 
a means of enabling individuals to pursue their own strivings for betterment. 
In response to the argument that the working man could only better his condition at the 
expense of the wealthy, the advocates of the Mechanicsʹ Institutes adopted the position that a 
society organised in conformity with the mechanism of the market would result in betterment 
for all. Brougham (1825) and Walker (1825) abandoned the notion that profits and wages were 
inversely proportional and espoused the idea that material improvement for the working 
population was both practical and desirable, provided that profits increased at the same time as 
wages. This was possible because “the increased command over inanimate nature would lead 
to new discoveries; every product of art would be of a superior quality; for it is chimeral to 
suppose that human ingenuity may not be exerted in an infinitely greater degree than at 
present upon the mass of inexhaustible materials which commerce and locality place within our 
reach” (Walker 1825, 21). In reply to those who claimed that the working man could only satisfy 
his desire for self-improvement at the expense of individuals above him in the social hierarchy, 
the same writer assured his readers that “if the artisan arrived at a state of ease, when in place 
of a contracted room he could afford a house equal to his present master, no alarm need be 
entertained lest the higher classes would suffer by this change; on the contrary the master 
would be provided with a better mansion and the genuine nobleman with a palace” (22). Belief 
in human ingenuity and the inexhaustibility of natural resources opened up the possibility that 
working men, like their employers, could contribute to general prosperity by pursuing their 
own. 
Promoters of the Mechanicsʹ Institutes believed that only education that increased the 
skill and productivity of workers could contribute to the twin goals of national prosperity and 
individual well-being. For this reason, they insisted on a practical scientific education which 
had an obvious connection to workersʹ everyday lives. In his outline of the curriculum 
proposed for Mechanicsʹ Institutes, Brougham (1825, 10) advised that the “doctrines of Algebra, 
Geometry and Mechanics” be illustrated by “examples calculated to strike the imagination,” 
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making clear “their connection with other branches of knowledge and the arts of common life.” 
Other recommended subjects were Natural Philosophy (physics), Mechanical Philosophy, 
Chemistry, Astronomy, and Geology. Since the development of speculative or philosophical 
thought was deemed impractical for working men who must earn their living through long 
hours of physical labour, for them to “go through the whole steps of that beautiful system, by 
which the most general and remote truths are connected with the few simple definitions and 
axioms” was unnecessary. The focus was on increasing the workmanʹs economic value to 
himself and his employer through immediately useful information and skills. “[T]o impart an 
accurate knowledge of the most useful fundamental propositions, with their application to 
practical purposes” (9) was sufficient. 
The proponents of the Institutes believed that in addition to increasing productivity and 
wage earning capacity, acquaintance with the rudiments of practical science also taught the 
working man that the physical world was governed by natural laws. The study of science 
pointed out the “relationships and the presence of a practical design of which the worker 
would otherwise be unaware” (Shapin and Barnes 1977, 36). This prepared the mind of the 
worker to understand that his social and economic relations were also subject to natural laws 
because, “in being brought to perceive the rational organisation of nature, he would perceive, 
(metaphorically or directly) the rational organisation of society also” (42). Proponents such as 
Brougham and Hodgskin believed that this understanding should be formalised by the study of 
political economy. According to Hodgskin (1824, xxiii), “a knowledge of the natural laws which 
regulate the production of wealth, and consequently the progress of civilisation, is equally, if 
not more, essential to the welfare of man, than a knowledge of any other part of the wide 
creation.” 
For Brougham and his supporters, the teaching of political economy was intended to 
safeguard working men from the deceptions of those who advocated collective action in strikes 
and civil disobedience as the most effective way to increase wages. Union activity was 
condemned as an interference with the natural laws of wealth creation because it limited the 
freedom of the labourer to pursue his own self-interest by depriving him of what Hayek (1947, 
170) was later to call the “signal-function of prices” necessary to guide the sale of his labour. 
Brougham believed that strikes and combinations were a result of the failure of working men to 
understand the true relationship between profit and wages, a deficiency which could be 
remedied by the study of political economy. Arguing for its inclusion in the curriculum of the 
Institutes, he stated: “I can hardly imagine a greater service being rendered to the men than by 
expounding to them the true principles and mutual relations of population and wages” (1825, 
5). 
Finally, supporters of the Institutes believed that technical education, as with education 
in general, encouraged ways of reflecting and calculating which were useful in opportunities 
for increased consumption. They saw technical knowledge as an efficacious adjunct to religious 
knowledge because both were able to offer the labourer ways of inspecting, ordering, and 
evaluating his desires. Men such as Brougham believed that continued independence from 
public welfare rested on the working manʹs ability to adopt a perspective that took proper 
account of the consequences of individual choices beyond their immediate, and especially 
sensory, satisfactions. A scientific education was useful because it provided the ability to make 
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calculations about both the evils and advantages of a particular course of action, placing 
passing desires in a stable intellectual framework suitable for the assessing of their gratification 
against a hierarchy of other interests (Shapin and Barnes 1977, 48). The study of science was 
credited with accustoming “the mind to a method and correctness of reasoning” (Rose 1991, 
683) which provided practical tools for calculation of the monetary costs and benefits of 
differing choices. 
 
Arguments Against the Institutes 
 
The confidence that a scientific education could contribute to a social milieu in which the 
aspirations and desires of ordinary working men were compatible with social order and 
national prosperity was not shared by the opponents of Mechanics’ Institutes. Their arguments 
were based on a hierarchical model of society in which the majority must accept their place 
within the social order and perform their allotted function within an unequal division of 
labour. Reverend Grinfield, Reverend Wright (both Established Church clerics), and A Country 
Gentleman were representative of the majority view in the Church of England and many, but 
not all Tories, who argued that a scientific education would destroy the established pattern of 
social relations. They assumed that the majority of the population must live near subsistence in 
order for the nation to avoid falling into decay, and echoed the argument, common in the 
eighteenth century, that frugality and social order were intimately connected. Both the 
nineteenth-century opponents of vocational education and the eighteenth-century 
householding model of the state shared the assumption that human strivings, if unrestrained, 
are disruptive and unpredictable. 
The belief of the opponents of the Mechanics’ Institutes that the labouring population 
must live at subsistence level arose from the conception of society as a finely-balanced social 
hierarchy, dependent for its stability on the existing distribution of the population into 
graduated levels. According to Harrison (1961, 173), this view was common among Established 
Church clergy, and Altick (1957) records that it was shared by conservative political opinion. 
Grinfield (1825), Wright (1826), and A Country Gentleman (1826) all assumed that any 
movement up the scale by some necessitated movement downwards by others. An increase in 
the standard of living of the working classes was interpreted as a movement up the scale; 
Grinfield and Wright assumed that social stability and national prosperity depended upon 
labourers’ acceptance of their place at the bottom of the social order. 
At its most extreme, the argument against Mechanics’ Institutes warned that the kind of 
education proposed in Practical Observations would lead to violent social upheaval. A Country 
Gentleman (1826) advised his readers that a scientific education would upset the present 
system of limited monarchy, leading to demands for a democracy. He castigated Brougham’s 
optimistic view of human nature, arguing that “it is the passions and prejudices, not the reason, 
of the people that bear undisputed sway when they have the power” (53). Reverend Wright 
(1826, 15) voiced similar alarm. He cautioned that the curriculum of the Mechanics’ Institutes 
would lead working people to mix “their own passions and feelings with the subject,” resulting 
in “those extremes to which strong impulses always verge.” They would doubtless have agreed 
with the lawyer who, at a meeting to organise the Southwark Mechanics’ Institute, warned that 
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as a consequence of teaching algebra, botany, navigation, and astronomy to working men, 
“[s]ociety would be uprooted, the marks which distinguish different classes thrown down, the 
government overturned and a state of anarchy would be the ultimate result” (cited in New 
1961, 343). 
In addition to the fear that scientific education would undermine the existing social 
order, many, especially the Church of England clergy, feared that it would lead to irreligion 
and immorality. Brougham and Birbeck claimed that “education would necessarily make men 
more virtuous” (Kelly 1957, 107) to which Wright (1826, 4) countered that “[s]ome persons of 
perverted minds have recently adopted a strange idea, viz. that to teach the use of reasoning 
powers, independent of all religious or moral culture[,] is education.” Grinfield (1825) 
acknowledged that the time had passed when labourers could be denied education but was 
strongly of the view that their education must be “subservient to their advancement in piety 
and morals” because a scientific education concerned only with “the present life” would not 
contribute to their eternal salvation. Rather than diverting resources to education for adults, he 
urged all supporters of the Church and state to rally behind the National Schools of the 
Established Church as the best means of teaching “godliness with contentment.” 
Grinfield (1825) and Wright (1826) also argued that Mechanics’ Institutes would have 
detrimental effect on family life. The men, Grinfield felt, would go from the Institute to the 
alehouse or tavern, after which they would return home “quite unfitted to join in the domestic 
circle” (1825, 16). He felt it would be much better to extend circulating libraries containing 
religious works and cheap editions of books by popular authors, vetted by the upper classes, 
which men could read at home. Such provision would permit the working man “the 
advantages of reading at home by the cottager’s fireside and in the midst of his own family”2 
(20). For Grinfield, Wright, and all those whose conceptual horizons were bounded by the 
householding model of society, it was impossible to conceive that education had any legitimate 
purpose beyond its function of forming obedient individuals capable of exercising personal 
restraint through conformity to a moral code. They simply could not accept that individual 




The debate about the desirability of a scientific education for working men illustrates a 
fundamental transition in thinking about the nature of commercial society. The opponents of 
Mechanics’ Institutes based their arguments upon the assumption that the moral purpose of the 
state was to preserve a natural hierarchical order, modelled on the patriarchal household. In 
such an order, prosperity and social stability needed government intervention to ensure that 
the working population lived close to subsistence levels. Similar to their eighteenth-century 
counterparts, the nineteenth-century opponents of vocational education assumed that human 
strivings for material betterment, if unrestrained, were disruptive and unpredictable. They 
argued that a scientific education would awaken inappropriate ambition and weaken wage-
earners preparedness to accept their appointed place in an unequal division of labour. 
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 The opponents of a scientific education for wage-earners could not conceive that 
individual personal strivings were compatible with national prosperity and social order. In 
contrast, the assumption that a stable social order based on a free labour market could sustain 
itself without detailed moral supervision or external restraint was a critical element of the 
moral purpose of the state which emerged at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The 
moral ethos oriented to creating a social order modelled on the patriarchal household was 
displaced by a moral purpose founded upon individual striving for betterment. The conditions 
under which human strivings and national economic security were mutually reinforcing was 
articulated in the emerging discipline of political economy. Political economists assumed that if 
distortions in the labour market were removed, labourers could be encouraged to pursue their 
own material improvement. Critical to the removal of distortions was a rejection of a 
redistributive role for the state, evidenced in proposals for the abolition of the Poor Laws.  
 The idea that working class people should be free to pursue their own self-betterment 
was linked to voluntary participation in self-funded education within the context of a free 
labour market. Improvement in the material circumstances of wage-earners became a matter of 
individual effort and motivation in which education played a critical role. In the thought of its 
proponents, a scientific education, to borrow a phrase from Corrigan and Sayer (1985), was a 
means by which labour in society could be normalised and individualised while 
simultaneously labour as a commodity could be made more productive. The ability of 
education to reconcile these two functions accounts for its privileged place in the public policy 




1. In the 1798 edition of An Essay on the Principle of Population, Malthus argued, based on his observation 
of the English labourers, that manufactured goods and luxuries should be banned from America because 
of their negative effect upon morals and well-being. In the 1817 edition, Malthus introduced the idea that 
the limited consumption of non-necessary items (luxuries) could become a means to induce the poor to 
work more regularly and more diligently. 
2. Reverend Wright shared Grinfield’s concern that the Institutes encouraged misplaced social ambition 
and were destructive of family life, as evidenced in his ironic expression of concern for the wives of 
labourers. Wright accused Brougham of being so “engrossed” by the men’s needs that he had “quite 
neglected their wives.” He pointed out “[n]ot a word is said throughout the pamphlet about their 
education, not any measure devised for obtaining the accomplishments of music, drawing etc. Perhaps 





Altick, Richard D. 1957. The English Common Reader. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
A Country Gentleman. 1826. Consequences of a Scientific Education to the Working Classes. London. 
Brougham, Henry. 1825. Practical Observations upon the Education of the People. London. 
Corrigan, Phillip, and Derek Sayer. 1985. The Great Arch. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Grinfield, E. 1825. Reply to Mr Broughamʹs ”Practical Observations.” London. 
History of Intellectual Culture, 2005  
 
14
Gwynn, John. 1766. London and Westminster Improved. London. 
Hanway, Jonas. 1767. Letters on the Importance of the. . . Labouring Part of our Fellow Men. London. 
Harrison, J.F.C. 1961. Living and Learning: 1790-1960. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Hayek, Friedrich von. 1947. Individualism and Economic Order. London: Routledge and Keegan Paul. 
_____. 1967. Studies in Philosophy Politics and Economics. London: Routledge and Keegan Paul. 
_____. 1985. New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History Of Ideas. London: Routledge and 
Keegan Paul. 
Helliwell, Christine, and Barry Hindess. 1999. “’Culture’, ‘Society’ and ‘The Figure of Man’.” History of the 
Human Sciences 12 (4):1-20. 
Hindess, Barry. 1996. “Liberalism, Socialism, Democracy: Variations on a Governmental Theme.” In 
Foucault and Political Reason, edited by A. Barry, T. Osborne, and N. Rose, 65-80. London: 
University of London Press. 
Hodgskin, Thomas. 1824. Popular Political Economy. New York: Augustus Kelly. 
Kelly, Thomas. 1957. George Birbeck. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. 
_____. 1970. A History Of Adult Education in Great Britain. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. 
Malthus, Thomas. 1989. An Essay on the Principles of Population. Edited by Patricia James. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Martin, Henry. 1825. Observations on the Importance and Advantages of the Education of the People. London. 
New, Chester. 1961. The Life of Henry Brougham to 1830. Oxford: Clarendon. 
Reus-Smit, Christian. 1999. The Moral Purpose of the State. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Rose, Nikolas. 1991. “Governing By Numbers.” Accounting, Organizations and Society (16): 673-92. 
Rose, Nikolas and Peter Miller. 1992. “Political Power Beyond the State: Problematics of Government.” 
British Journal of Sociology (12): 173-205. 
Shapin, Steven, and Barry Barnes. 1977. “Science, Nature, Control: Interpreting Mechanicsʹ Institutes.” 
Social Studies of Science (7): 31-74. 
Steuart, James. 1767. An Inquiry Into the Principles of Political Oeconomy. Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd. 
Stewart, Robert. 1985. Henry Brougham. London: Bodley Head. 
Tribe, Keith. 1978. Land, Labour and Economic Discourse. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Tucker, Josiah. 1755. The Elements of Commerce and the Theory of Taxes. Wakefield: S.R. Publishers. 
Tylecote, Mabel. 1957. The Mechanicsʹ Institutes of Lancashire and Yorkshire before 1851. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press. 
Walker, James. 1825. An Essay on the Education of the People. London. 
Wittrock, Bjorn, Johan Heilbron, and Lars Magnusson. 1998. “The Rise of the Social Sciences and the 
Formation of Modernity.” In The Rise of the Social Sciences and the Formation of Modernity: 
Conceptual Change in Context 1750-1850, edited by J. Heilbron, L. Magnusson and B. Wittrock, 1-
33. Boston: Kluwer. 
Wright, G. 1826. Mischiefs Exposed. London. 
 
 
